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CHOICE OF LAW AND EMPLOYEE
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS:
AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
Gillian Lestert and Elizabeth Ryantt
I. INTRODUCTION
Employees are increasingly mobile across state lines. This is
partly the result of technological change facilitating individual
movement and communication, but also a result of corresponding
changes in corporate organization to establish offices and interests in
multiple jurisdictions. With these developments, there has been a rise
in litigation surrounding the enforcement of employee covenants not
to compete when the parties or issues involved have connections to
multiple jurisdictions. The emerging body of law intrigues and
confounds lawyers and commentators because of its complexity and
unpredictability. This essay is an effort to describe recent legal
developments in the United States, situating them within the
background doctrines of conflict of laws and parallel litigation that
govern such disputes. Our aim is to provide a useful comparison with
the other essays in this volume dealing with developments in other
countries on the same subject.
A covenant not to compete (also referred to as a restrictive
covenant or non-compete agreement or NCA) is an agreement that an
employee will not compete against the employer, or go to work for a
competitor, for some specified period after termination of
employment.1 The contract typically also specifies a geographic
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Herma Hill Kay, Joseph Singer, and Jan Vetter for helpful suggestions. Anne Abramowitz
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1. Rather than prohibiting competition altogether, a covenant might instead impose some
kind of penalty in the event that a former employee competes, like a sum of liquidated damages,
or forfeiture of stock options or pension benefits. Insofar as these also have the effect of
inhibiting competition, courts will ordinarily analyze these in the same way they would analyze
any employee restrictive covenant. See, e.g., Anniston Urologic Ass'n, P.C. v. Kline, 689 So.2d
389
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region, and may specify a trade or profession in which competition is
prohibited. Although such restrictions are presumptively
unenforceable at common law on public policy grounds, courts in
most states will grant an exception if the employer can demonstrate
that the covenant in question safeguards a legitimate interest and is
reasonable in its scope. The most commonly recognized legitimate
interest is the protection of trade secrets.2 Depending on the state,
courts may also recognize other legitimate interests such as customer
relationships and goodwill,3 confidential information not rising to the
level of a trade secret,4 and the services of employees with unique or
extraordinary talents (although ordinary training is not usually
protectable).'
The other limitation on enforceability is that the covenant must
be "reasonable." A broad set of public policy concerns informs the
reasonableness test: courts are concerned with protecting employees
from hardship, often citing inequality of bargaining power as a basis
for giving special scrutiny to non-compete agreements.6 Courts also
articulate a general resistance to restraints on trade.' There is a strong
imperative that the restriction be no greater in terms of duration,
geographic scope, and limitation on vocational activities than is
reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the employer.8
54, 57 (Ala. 1997) (holding that a covenant reducing purchase price of employees' stock options
in the event of competition is a restraint on practicing profession and the fact that it is couched
in terms of liquidated damages rather than in negative form is not significant); B.D.O. Seidman
v. Hirschberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1222-23 (N.Y. 1999) (noting that an agreement requiring
employee to pay monetary compensation for competing is, in purpose and effect, a form of
ancillary anti-competitive agreement and subject to a reasonableness test).
2. Geritex Corp. v. Dermarite Indus., LLC, 910 F.Supp. 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating
that protectable employer interests include trade secrets and confidential customer lists);
Hayden's Sport Ctr., Inc. v. Johnson, 441 N.E.2d 927, 932 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that
enforcing a non-compete covenant requires an employer to show injury to a legitimate business
interest, such as a trade secret, separate and distinct from defendants' breach of covenant).
3. Acas Acquisitions (Precitech) Inc. v. Hobert, 923 A.2d 1076 (N.H. 2007) (holding that
protectable interests include employee's influence over customers and contracts obtained during
employment and good will emanating from client); St. Clair Med. P.C. v. Borgiel, 715 N.W.2d
914 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that legitimate interests include goodwill in the community
developed by an employer's medical practice).
4. Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that
confidential information regarding a company's computer hardware development, while not
rising to the level of a trade secret, protectable under a covenant not to compete).
5. See, e.g., The 7's Enters v. Del Rosio, 143 P.3d 23 (Haw. 2006) (holding unique training
of a "briefer" in the tourism industry protectable in tandem with other factors); Clooney v.
WCPO Television Division of Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 300 N.E.2d 256 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973)
(finding a television personality's unique services to be a legitimate interest).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188, cmt. g (1981).
7. Id.
8. Id. § 188 (1)(a)(b), cmts. b-d. The seminal holding on the enforceability of reasonable
restraints remains the eighteenth-century English decision of Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24
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Occasionally, a court will declare a restrictive covenant contrary
to the public interest independent of the other factors in the
reasonableness test. For example, courts in some states have limited
the enforcement of restrictive covenants against physicians on the
basis that the public has an interest in unconstrained access to doctors'
services.9  In the realm of legal services, the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit attorneys
from entering into an "agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to
practice after termination.., except an agreement concerning
benefits upon retirement."1° As a result, most states are very hostile
to restrictive covenants for attorneys, again with the rationale that it is
in the interest of the public to have unencumbered access to
attorneys."
Courts in some states are willing to reform an unreasonable non-
compete agreement by either excising ("blue penciling") an
unreasonable term," or by redrafting an overbroad term to make it
reasonable.13 Courts in other states categorically refuse to enforce
overbroad restrictive covenants, concerned that employers will be
tempted to draft overbroad contracts that chill employee mobility,
knowing that if the contract is later challenged for overbreadth the
drafter can request enforcement in a modified form. 4
Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B.) (holding restraints on competition presumptively unenforceable, though
presumption may be rebutted if restraint is reasonable).
9. See, e.g., Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 682-83 (Tenn. 2005)
(finding that public policy and legislative intent dictate that restrictive covenants against almost
all physicians must be strictly limited). But see Med. Specialists Inc. v. Sleweon, 652 N.E.2d 517,
527 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) ("Covenants ... which restrict the provision of medical services . . . are
not per se against public policy."); Calhoun v. WHA Med. Clinic, PLLC, 632 S.E.2d 563 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2006) (finding that restrictive covenants for physicians are not per se unreasonable).
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2002).
11. Jacob v. Norris, 607 A.2d 142, 146 (N.J. 1992) (explaining that limited availability of
restrictive covenants on attorneys will serve the public interest in having "maximum access to
lawyers" and freedom of choice in selecting counsel); Pettingell v. Morrison, Mahoney & Miller,
687 N.E.2d 1237, 1239 (Mass. 1997) (stating that prohibition against restrictive covenants is
motivated by the interests of clients, not the lawyers themselves).
12. See, e.g., Intermountain Eye and Laser Ctrs., P.L.L.C. v. Miller, 127 P.3d 121, 131
(Idaho 2005) (suggesting that trial court "blue-pencil" the restrictive covenant upon remand);
Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 683 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (stating that
Indiana courts will strike clauses to allow partial enforcement of the covenant); B.D.O. Seidman
v. Hirschberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 395 (1999) (severing a portion of the covenant to provide for
partial enforcement).
13. See, e.g., Total Health Physicians, S.C. v. Barrientos, 502 N.E. 2d 1240, 1242-43 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986) (limiting the geographic area of an overbroad covenant to an area that was
reasonable). See also Orchard Container Corp. v. Orchard, 601 S.W.2d 299, 303-04 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980) (reducing scope of non-compete agreements from 200- to 125-mile radius); Daughtry
v. Capital Gas Co., 229 So.2d 480, 484 (Ala. 1969) (limiting injunctive relief to one Alabama
county as opposed to the multi-county area prescribed by the non-compete agreement).
14. E.g., CAE Vanguard, Inc. v. Newman, 518 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Neb. 1994) (finding that
Nebraska adopts the "minority view" that courts may not reform covenants since doing so is
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A key point is that states vary widely in their friendliness to
employee non-compete agreements. A few states, such as California,
have such a strong policy favoring employee mobility that they either
prohibit or very strictly limit such agreements. 5 A number of legal
scholars have speculated that the success of Silicon Valley may be
due, at least in part, to California's weak enforcement regime. The
nub of their argument is that weak enforcement within "high velocity"
labor markets-where highly-skilled employees move fluidly between
firms taking ideas and innovations with them-permits the rapid
diffusion of information, leading to industry-wide technological gains
that arguably swamp the investment disincentives that weak
entitlements may engender. 6 Moreover, even among states more
willing to enforce reasonable agreements, the ease of creating and
enforcing restrictive covenants varies widely. Some states operate
under constitutional limitations that impose strict limits on
enforcement, 7 some require consideration, 8 some statutorily limit
equivalent to creating private agreements); Richard P. Rita Pers. Servs. Int'l, Inc. v. Kot, 191
S.E.2d 79, 81 (Ga. 1972) (declining blue penciling in Georgia because it would encourage
employers to write overbroad covenants and "exercise an in terrorem effect on employees")
(citing Harlan M. Blake, Employee Covenants Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 641-46
(1960)).
15. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-16602.5 (2008) (prohibiting non-compete
covenants beyond those attached to sale of goodwill of a business, or upon dissolution of
partnership or limited liability corporation). See also HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 480-84(c) (2008)
(prohibiting non-compete agreements except in connection with the sale of a business or
partnership or to protect trade secrets); MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 28-2-703-704 (2008) (prohibiting
non-compete agreements except in connection with the sale of a business or withdrawal from a
partnership, the use of a leased premises, and the preservation of trade secrets); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 9-08-06 (2008) (prohibiting non-compete agreements except those in connection with
the sale of a business or dissolution of a partnership). Note that even in states that have near-
total prohibitions, reasonable employee restraints for purposes of protecting trade secrets are
enforceable. See, e.g., Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (citing
Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 42 Cal. Rptr. 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965) (making an
exception to an ordinary statutory rule invalidating covenants not to compete where covenant
attempts to protect trades secrets)).
16. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 608-09 (1999);
ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-
VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 44 (2003).
17. Article III of the Georgia Constitution prohibits contracts that may have the effect of
lessening competition, and Georgia courts have interpreted this as placing very strict limits on
non-compete agreements. See Allen v. Hub Cap Heaven, Inc., 484 S.E. 2d 259, 264 (Ga. 1997)
(stating that while not all employee noncompetition covenants are held to run afoul of the
Georgia Constitution, an agreement entered into by an employee is enforceable only where it is
strictly limited in time and territorial effect and is otherwise reasonable considering the business
interest sought to be protected).
18. E.g., Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 207, 208 (S.C. 2001) (requiring
additional consideration beyond continued at-will employment in order to enforce non-compete
covenant); Labriola v. Pollard Group, Inc., 100 P.3d 791, 794-95 (Wash. 2004) (holding a
covenant not ancillary to an initial hiring agreement can be sustained only if supported by
independent consideration beyond continued employment); National Recruiters, Inc. v.
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duration," some limit protectable interests (other than trade secrets)
to an employer's well-established customer relationships,2' some
distinguish between high-level employees and others,1 some permit,
and others prohibit, reformation or blue-penciling.22
It is this variation among states in their willingness to enforce
non-compete agreements that creates the conditions for conflict of
laws and strategic litigation. The employee may work for a company
in one state and sign a non-compete agreement in that state, but then
get recruited away to a company in another state that is less willing to
enforce non-competes. The former employer wants to enforce the
non-compete agreement and the employee and/or acquiring employer
want to invalidate it. How do American courts decide which law to
apply?
This article considers this question in two sections. In Section II,
we briefly review the core principles that govern disputes involving
conflicts between the laws of different states. Although this body of
doctrine spans many different areas of law, our focus throughout is
cases concerning employee non-compete agreements. In particular,
we describe approaches courts have taken depending on whether the
parties have or have not included a choice of law clause in their
agreement. We also consider the influence of a forum selection
clause. In Section III, we turn to the challenges associated with
parallel litigation and describe the legal context in which parties may
have an incentive to "race to the courthouse" to increase the
likelihood of favorable judgment. Section IV briefly concludes.
Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982); Tom James of Dallas, Inc. v. Cobb, 109 S.W. 3d
877 (Tex. Civ. App. 2003).
19. See S. D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (2008) ("An employee may agree ... [1] not to
engage directly or indirectly in the same business or profession as the employer for any period
not exceeding two years from the date of termination of the agreement and [2] not to solicit the
employer's existing customers within a... county,.., municipality, or other specified area for up
to two years ... if the employer continues to carry on a like business there."). See also LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (2009) (noting a two-year limitation on employee non-compete
agreements).
20. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (2009) (prohibiting non-compete agreements except those
connected to the sale of a business or dissolution of a partnership, or those prohibiting
solicitation of business from former employer's established customers); Applebaum v.
Applebaum, 823 N.E.2d 1074, 1082-83 (I11. App. Ct. 2005) (discussing tests for determining
when an employer has "near-permanent" employee relationships that may be protected by a
non-compete covenant).
21. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2008) (prohibiting covenants not to compete with the
exception of those connected to the purchase and sale of a business or its assets, protecting trade
secrets, time-limited agreements for reimbursement of training costs, and those entered into by
executive and management personnel or their professional staffs).
22. See cases cited in supra notes 12, 14.
2010]
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II. EMPLOYEE NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS AND CONFLICT OF
LAWS
Before a court hearing a non-compete dispute with multi-state
aspects can reach any decision on the merits, it must determine what
law governs the agreement. Under modern, policy-oriented
approaches to choice of law, forum law should ordinarily provide the
rule of decision, and the burden is on the party seeking to displace
forum law to show that it would be proper to do so.23 As an initial
matter, the court should determine whether there is indeed a conflict
between the different states' laws. If all potentially applicable laws
would reach the same result, there is no conflict and the forum court
will apply its own law or interchangeably apply different states' laws.24
If potentially applicable laws would reach different results, but only
one state has an interest in applying its law, the situation is called "a
false conflict" and the forum court will apply the law of the only
interested state.25  If the forum and another state would reach
different results and both states have an interest in applying their
laws, then the forum must apply its own approach to choice of law to
determine which substantive law to apply.26 Courts perform choice of
law analyses in two different circumstances: where the parties have
agreed in advance through a choice of law clause what law should
apply to a particular dispute, and when they have not.
In the discussion that follows, we will focus on the rules in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts (hereinafter Restatement) given
that most states have adopted them, at least formally.27 To do so
without any caveats, however, risks oversimplification. For one thing,
not all states follow the Restatement. But even among states that
adopt the Restatement, there is considerable variation in how their
courts-both between and within jurisdictions-interpret and
23. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF
LAWS 242 (3d ed. 2002).
24. R.A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW § 92 (4th ed. 1986). See also
Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 230 (3d Cir. 2007); Air Prods. & Chems., 272 F.
Supp. 2d 482, 490 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Boston Hides & Furs v. Sumitomo Bank, 870 F. Supp.
1153, 1159 (Dist. Mass. 1994).
25. Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 171, 178 (1959).
26. The forum court will apply the choice of law rules of its own state. See e.g., Beckler v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 195 Ariz. 282, 285 (1999); Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 230
Conn. 335, 345 n.6 (1994). A federal court must apply the choice of law rules in the state where
it sits. Klaxon Co. v Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313
U.S. 498,503 (1941).
27. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2008: Twenty-Second
Annual Survey, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 269, 279 (2009) (reporting that a majority of states have
adopted the Restatement rules).
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implement the rules.28 The state of the law is perhaps characterized
more by inconsistency than anything else, so much so that
commentators lament the "disarray ' 29 and "mish-mash"3 ° of the law,
and criticize courts for their "post-hoc rationalizing of intuitions"" or
their use of a "hodgepodge of factors, often with insignificant
explanation of how they decide what weight to give each. 32
In this essay, we do not purport to make sense of the theories
different courts adopt, nor to develop an independent theory of how
conflicts ought to be resolved in cases involving covenants not to
compete. Our goal is the more modest one of reviewing recent
decisional law in American courts as they confront an increasing
number of non-compete disputes with inter-state features, and
offering some brief observations on how current law might influence
both litigants and state regulatory policy going forward.
A. Choice of Law Analysis in the Absence of a Choice of Law
Provision
In the absence of a choice of law clause, courts traditionally relied
on territorial rules, such as lex loci contractus or the place of
contracting rule, to determine which law to apply.33 Although some
continue to apply these relatively straightforward territorial rules,
most states have now adopted the interest-based analysis from
Currie's "governmental interest approach" reflected in Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Laws section 188, or something very similar.34
The Restatement test is sometimes referred to as the "Center of
Gravity" or "Grouping of Contracts" test, and is designed to
determine which state has the most significant relationship to or
greatest interest implicated by a particular transaction.
Under the Restatement test, a court weighs the interests of the
place where the contract was negotiated and formed, the jurisdiction
where performance or the object of the contract was to take place,
28. See generally, RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 23 at 272-76 (reviewing scholarly
criticism of modern choice of law doctrine). See also Herma Hill Kay, Theory Into Practice:
Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521 (1983) (reviewing theories underlying
choice of law analyses across states and showing how many courts apply more than one theory).
29. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, id. at 272.
30. Robert Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1094 (1981).
31. Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments,
39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465 (1991).
32. Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731, 732 (1990).
33. See, e.g., Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 379 (1878).
34. See, e.g., Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 276 Ga. 808, 812 (2003); Vantage Tech. LLC v.
Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 650 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Trans-American Collections, Inc. v.
Continental Account Servicing House, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303, 1305 (D. Utah 1972).
2010]
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and the citizenship or place of incorporation of the parties.35 This
gives courts considerable discretion, and does not always result in the
application of the law of the forum.36 Where a contract was made in
one jurisdiction and parties intended to perform it in that same
jurisdiction, there is a presumption that the law of that state will
apply, even if it is different from the law of the forum state.37 When
the parties contracted in one place and intended to perform in
another, modern courts often apply the law of the place of
performance. At least one state that applies the Restatement has
adopted a bright line rule that, in the case of personal service
contracts, the place of performance should apply.39 However, in most
states applying the Restatement there is no clear-cut rule and courts
will sometimes apply the law of the place of contracting, particularly if
any part of the performance occurred there." Notably, courts will
disregard the foregoing rules and apply the substantive law of the
forum if applying another state's law would undermine the public
policy of the forum.4
B. Choice of Law Analysis When Parties Have Included a Choice of
Law Clause
Because the substantive law governing non-compete covenants
varies substantially from state to state, parties often include a choice
of law clause, which expressly designates a particular state's law for
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, § 188.
36. See, e.g., Rollins, Inc. v. Parker, 755 So.2d 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (applying
Georgia law); Ranch Hand Foods, Inc. v. Polar Pak Foods, Inc. 690 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) (applying Kansas law).
37. See, e.g,, Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D.C. Conn. 1952) (applying
Rhode Island law in light of findings that agreement was executed and intended to be
performed, and plaintiff's plant was located in, Rhode Island).
38. Holland Furnace Co. v. Connelley, 48 F. Supp. 543, 548 (E.D. Mo. 1942) (holding that in
cases of conflict the lex solutionis will prevail over the lex loci conractus).
39. DeSantis v. Wackenhurt Corp.,793 S.W.2d 670, 697 (Tex. 1990) (holding that, as a rule,
the place of performance of personal services alone is conclusive in determining what state's law
is to apply).
40. See, e.g., Award Incentives, Inc. v. Van Rooyen, 263 F.2d 173, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1959).
41. There are some federal constitutional boundaries on the ability of a state to apply its
own law. The limitations that do exist derive from the due process clause and full faith and
credit clause, the gist being that a state should not apply its own laws when there is no
connection between the forum and the litigants. However, the standard for permissible
application of forum law is so liberal as to exclude only the most extreme cases. For application
of the forum state's law to violate the Constitution it must be so "totally arbitrary or . . .
fundamentally unfair" to a litigant that it violates the due process clause. Allstate v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 326 (1981). If the forum court has no connection to the lawsuit other than its
jurisdiction over the parties, a decision to apply forum law might so "[frustrate] the justifiable
expectations of the parties" as to be unconstitutional. Id. at 327.
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resolving future disputes.4" In general, courts defer to choice of law
clauses because they are presumed to represent the express intention
of the parties.43 Courts have adopted varying approaches to deciding
when to override party choice. Some states refuse to enforce any
contract that, when interpreted under the law of the state selected in a
choice of law clause, would violate a public policy of the forum.' The
Restatement approach, at least theoretically, is more deferential to
party choice. A court following the Restatement approach will not
apply the law of the chosen state if either of two circumstances
arises.45 First, it will not defer to the choice of law clause if the chosen
state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction
and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice.'
Second, it will not apply the law of the chosen state if that law would
be contrary to a fundamental public policy of a state with a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue, and which, under the rule of section 188, would be the
state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law
by the parties.47
Analysis of the first inquiry-no substantial relationship or other
basis-tends to be relatively straightforward, although one question
that has generated mixed precedent is whether a party's place of
incorporation is a significant enough connection to create a substantial
relationship." The second path to invalidation of a choice of law
clause is more complex. Most courts cleave the analysis into two
questions. First, they ask whether another state has a materially
greater interest in the dispute, and second, whether applying the law
chosen would violate the public policy of the state with a materially
42. See Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Non-Compete
Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1381, 1383 n.8 (2008) (speculating, based on the frequent inclusion of choice of law clauses in
sample or model contracts prepared by attorneys and others offering risk management advice,
that inclusion of such clauses is becoming more common).
43. See, e.g., Kuehn v. Children's Hosp., Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 1296, 1301 (7th Cir. 1997)
("Choice of law clauses are common and when reasonable are enforced.").
44. E.g., Stonhard, Inc. v. Carolina Flooring Specialists, Inc., 366 S.C. 156, 159 (S.C. 2005).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, supra note 35, §§ 187-88.
46. Id. § 187(2)(a).
47. Id. § 187(2)(b).
48. Compare Am. Exp. Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Topel, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1238 (D. Colo.
1999) ("Amex's principal place of business is in Minneapolis, Minnesota. This fact alone
provides a sufficient basis for the parties' choice of law.") and Nordson Corp. v. Plasschaert, 674
F.2d 1371, 1375 (11th Cir. 1982) with Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 948-49 (7th Cir.
1994) (invalidating a choice of law clause on grounds that no substantial relationship existed
where the only relationship between the chosen state and the transaction was that it was the
place of incorporation for one party).
2010]
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greater interest and whose law would apply in the absence of a choice
of law clause.
1. Materially Greater Interest
The question here is whether a state other than the chosen
state-either the forum state or another state-has a materially
greater interest in the dispute.49 Most courts look to factors that are
the same as or similar to those they would apply in the absence of a
choice of law clause under the Restatement section 188 significant
relationship test: they focus on the residency of contracting parties
and where the parties intended the contract to be performed. 0 In the
event of a tie, at least one court has said it will defer to the choice of
law clause.5 Although the second question-whether application of
the chosen law would offend the public policy of the state with a
materially greater interest-should ordinarily follow, some courts
conflate the two inquiries and conclude that another state has a
materially greater interest because its public policy would be offended
if the chosen law were applied. 2 When this happens, the interest
balancing test is reduced to a starker contest among competing public
policies.
2. Violation of Public Policy
If the court concludes that a state other than the chosen state has
a materially greater interest, then it must determine whether
application of the chosen law would offend the public policy of that
other state. A minor difference in laws is not enough, at least in
49. This inquiry does not necessarily come out in favor of the forum state. For example, an
Indiana court asked to rule on a contract containing an Indiana choice of law clause found that
Louisiana had a materially greater interest in the case. Zimmer, Inc. v. Sharpe, No. 3:09-CV-117
RM 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68907, at *26 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 4, 2009).
50. See, e.g., King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 586 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding
that Colorado had a materially greater interest in dispute between New Jersey company and
plaintiff employee over a restrictive covenant with New Jersey choice of law clause because
"King is a resident of Colorado, he signed the contract in Colorado, and his sole place of work
was Colorado"); Cherry, Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 582 So.2d 502, 507-08 (Ala. 1991)
(determining that Alabama had a materially greater interest in enforceability of non-compete
covenant between a North Carolina company and an employee working in its Alabama office
despite North Carolina's choice of law clause because defendant was trying to enforce covenant
against an Alabama resident in Alabama).
51. Pro Edge, L.P. v. Gue, 374 F.Supp.2d 711,739 (N.D. Iowa 2005).
52. See, e.g., Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. SFR, Inc., 166 F.3d 1074, 1084 (10 h Cir. 1999)
("Colorado has a substantial connection to the contract because SFR is a Colorado corporation
with its principal place of business in Colorado. However, we believe that Utah has a materially
greater interest in the resolution of the issue because important policy considerations of Utah are
involved in assessing the validity of the covenant not to compete.") (emphasis added).
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theory, to violate public policy. Some courts hold that even
differences that would change the outcome should not necessarily lead
to the invalidation of the choice of law clause.53 However, it remains
unclear just how substantial the conflict must be to justify disregarding
the chosen law.
Some courts find it virtually impossible to apply the law of
another state that permits enforcement of non-compete covenants.
The Georgia Supreme Court, for example, has held that the same
public policies that underlie Georgia's firm prohibition against non-
compete agreements inform its choice of law analysis, implying that
choice of law clauses selecting law favorable to non-competes will be
regularly invalidated.54 In Enron Capital & Trade Resources Corp. v.
Pokalsky, the parties executed a non-compete agreement containing a
Texas choice of law clause while the employee worked for Enron in
Texas.5 The employee later accepted a position with a competitor in
Georgia, and filed for a declaration in Georgia state court that the
agreement was unenforceable. The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld
the trial court's decision to ignore the choice of law clause and
invalidate the non-compete agreement on the basis that the
agreement was "particularly distasteful" because of its overbreadth.56
Quoting Nasco v. Gimbert,57 the court asserted that:
[T]he law of the jurisdiction chosen by parties.., will not be
applied by Georgia courts where application of the chosen law
would contravene the policy of, or would be prejudicial to the
interests of, this state. Covenants against disclosure, like covenants
against competition, affect the interests of this state, namely the
flow of information needed for competition among businesses, and
hence their validity is determined by the public policy of this
state.s8
53. Labor Ready, Inc. v. Williams Staffing, LLC, 149 F. Supp. 2d 398, 406-07 (N.D. I11.
2001) (noting that although Washington more liberally blue penciled, and it was possible that
applying chosen Washington law would produce a different outcome, the differences were not
great enough to be repugnant to an interest of the state of Illinois); Vencor, Inc. v. Webb, 33
F.3d 840, 844-45 (7th Cir. 1994) (determining that even if Illinois law dictates a different
outcome on a particular question than the law of the state designated by the employment
contract, that difference does not require the court to find the chosen state's law so odious that a
court does not respect the parties' election to be governed by it).
54. Nasco Inc. v. Gimbert, 238 S.E.2d 368, 369 (Ga. 1977). See also Christopher D. David,
When a Promise is Not a Promise: Georgia's Law on Non-Compete Agreements, as Interpreted
by the Eleventh Circuit in Keener v. Convergys Corporation, Gives Rise to Comity and
Federalism Concerns, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 395, 399-405 (2004) (tracing the evolution of
Georgia law with respect to foreign choice of law clauses in non-compete agreements).
55. Enron Capital & Trade Resources Corp. v. Pokalsky, 490 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct. App.
1997) [hereinafter Enron].
56. Id. at 139.
57. Nasco, 238 S.E. 2d at 369.
58. Enron, 490 S.E.2d at 139.
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The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this approach in Keener v. Convergys,
in which an employee of an Ohio company relocated to Georgia after
having signed a two-year non-compete agreement.59 The court noted
that "the contract was entered into in Ohio, the contract selected
Ohio law, and it was the expectation of both parties that Ohio law
would apply."'  And yet, the court affirmed a Georgia district court
order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff on grounds that the
non-compete agreement was contrary to Georgia public policy, that
Georgia law therefore applied, and that the non-compete agreement
was unenforceable under Georgia law.6' We discuss other important
aspects of the Keener opinion below, in Section III.
Courts in California, another state with a strong public policy
against non-compete agreements, have taken a similar position.62 The
seminal case is Application Group v. Hunter, in which a Maryland
employer sought to enforce a restrictive covenant containing a
Maryland choice of law clause against a former employee who had
departed to work for a California employer and yet was not, and had
never been, a resident of California.63 The California Court of Appeal
held that California had a materially greater interest in the dispute,
given that enforcement would be contrary to California Business and
Professions Code section 16600,' 4 whereas non-enforcement would
not significantly impair Maryland interests because the type of
competition would not actually impair any of the "protectable
interests" required for enforcement of a non-compete in Maryland.65
The Court declared that to enforce the Maryland choice of law clause
would allow an out-of-state employer to limit employment and
business opportunities in California and that "California courts are
not bound to enforce a contractual choice of law provision which
would... be contrary to this state's fundamental public policy." 66
59. Keener v. Convergys, 342 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2003).
60. Id. at 1268 n.2.
61. Id. at 1269. See also Hulcher Servs., Inc. v. R.J. Corman R.R., 543 S.E.2d 461, 465 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to honor Texas choice of law clause in non-compete agreement on
grounds that application of Texas law would contravene public policy of Georgia).
62 See Christine L. Wu, Non-compete Agreements in California: Should California Courts
Uphold Choice of Law Provisions Specifying Another State's Law?, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 593,
594-95 (2003).
63. Application Group v. Hunter, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ("[I]t is
undisputed that [the employee] Pike never set foot in California, even for pleasure, during the
time she was employed by Hunter.").
64. See id. (describing the policy against enforcement of employee non-compete
agreements embodied in §16600).
65. Id. at 86.
66. Id.
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A year later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided IBM
Corp. v. Bajorek, concerning an employee who, while working for
IBM in New York, vested $900,000 worth of stock options and then
departed for a competitor in California.67 The employee had signed
an agreement containing a New York choice of law clause that
required him to remit the value of any stock options if he worked for
any competitor within six months of exercising the options. The
court's analysis, while not facially inconsistent with Application
Group's conclusion that California had a materially greater interest if
application of another state's law would lead to enforcement of an
employee covenant not to compete, applied the "narrow restraint"
doctrine to justify application of New York law. Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit treated the limitation on the exercise of stock options as
a narrow restraint that did not offend section 16600 because it
prohibited the employee from pursuing employment in only a small
corner of the market.68 Having reached this conclusion, the court
reasoned that application of New York law would not violate
California public policy.69 The Ninth Circuit's narrow restraint
doctrine has been controversial, and the California Supreme Court
expressly disavowed it in a recent decision.7"
Another New York-California choice of law dispute, this time
heard in a New York federal court, suggests that judgments about
which state has a greater interest in a non-compete agreement dispute
can be highly contingent on forum. Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra
involved an employee who lived in California throughout his
employment with a Delaware company that had its principle place of
business in New York.7' The parties had signed a non-compete with a
New York choice of law clause. Plaintiff argued that California had a
materially greater interest given the presence of significant contacts in
California and the strong California public policy against enforcement
of non-compete agreements.72 The New York court answered by
acknowledging that the enforcement of the non-compete agreement
in the present case would be contrary to a fundamental policy of
California, but concluded that there were significant contacts to New
York and therefore New York had a materially greater interest in the
dispute,73 and "New York's recognized interest in maintaining and
67. IBM v. Bajorek, 191 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 1040-41.
69. Id. at 1041-42.
70. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285,291-92 (Cal. 2008).
71. Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
72 Id. at 171.
73. Id. at 173.
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fostering its undisputed status as the preeminent commercial and
financial nerve center of the Nation and the world... naturally
embraces a very strong policy of assuring ready access to a forum for
redress of injuries arising out of transactions spawned here. 74
Despite the attention garnered by cases involving conflicts
between states that are willing to enforce reasonable employee non-
compete agreements beyond the limited context of protectable trade
secrets and those that categorically prohibit or virtually prohibit them,
it bears emphasis that conflicts also arise between states that have a
common willingness to enforce reasonable covenants but differ by
degree. An example is the recent case of Del Monte Fresh Produce,
N.A., Inc. v. Chiquita Brand Int'l, Inc.75 In this case, an Illinois district
court disregarded a Florida choice of law clause despite a reasonable
basis for selection of Florida law, because under Illinois law, a court
must consider hardship the covenant imposes on the individual
employee, whereas Florida law specifically prohibits consideration of
that factor in deciding the question of enforceability.76 As such, the
court ruled, application of Florida law would undermine a
fundamental public policy of Illinois.77 Another example is DCS
Sanitation Management, Inc. v. Castillo, upholding the decision of a
Nebraska district court to disregard the Ohio choice of law clause in
the parties' non-compete agreement on the basis that Nebraska had
materially greater interest in dispute and application of Ohio law
would permit blue-penciling, which violates a fundamental public
policy in Nebraska.78
C. Forum Selection Clauses
Forum selection clauses have proven to be more resistant to
judicial override. There are two types of forum selection clauses:
exclusive and non-exclusive. Non-exclusive forum selection clauses
require both parties to agree to waive objection to litigating in a
particular venue, but do not require parties to give up the right to
litigate elsewhere. Non-exclusive forum selection clauses help to
resolve questions about personal jurisdiction, but are not relevant to
the present discussion. Of interest to us are exclusive forum selection
74. Id.
75. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc. v. Chiquita Brand Int'l, Inc., 616 F.Supp.2d 805
(N. D. Ill. 2009).
76. Id. at 816.
77. Id.
78. DCS Sanitation Mgmt. Inc. v. Castillo, 435 F.3d 892, 895-96 (8th Cir. 2006).
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clauses, whereby parties agree that all disputes related to a particular
transaction should be litigated in the chosen state.
Exclusive forum selection clauses are prima facie valid.79
However, a choice of forum clause will be unenforceable if
enforcement contravenes a strong public policy of the forum.' The
Supreme Court in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. gave four
reasons a forum selection clause may not be enforced: (1)
enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust; (2) the clause is invalid
for reasons such as fraud or overreaching; (3) enforcement would
contravene a strong public policy of the forum where the suit was
brought; or, (4) the contractually selected forum would be seriously
inconvenient for trial.8'
In the non-compete context, although a choice of forum clause is
not a sure bet to ensuring application of a particular state's law to any
future disputes, recent decisions in a number of states suggest that
courts are more willing to defer to choice of forum clauses than choice
of law clauses.82
For example, in In re AutoNation, the plaintiff was a Texas
resident who managed a car dealership owned by the defendant
company, whose principal place of business and head office were in
Florida.83 The parties' non-compete agreement contained Florida
choice of law and forum selection clauses. After the plaintiff resigned
to work for a competitor elsewhere in Houston, the parties filed
parallel lawsuits in Texas and Florida disputing the enforceability of
the non-compete agreement. The Texas Supreme Court stated that if
it had heard the case it would likely have disregarded the choice of
law clause for public policy reasons. Nonetheless, it observed:
[W]e have never declared that fundamental public policy requires
that every employment dispute with a Texas resident must be
litigated in Texas.... [E]ven if precedent] requires Texas courts to
apply Texas law to certain employment disputes, it does not
require suits to be brought in Texas when a forum-selection clause
mandates venue elsewhere. 84
79. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
80. MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1972).
81. Id.
82. Glynn, supra note 42, at 1438 (identifying this phenomenon and discussing recent cases
consistent with it); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2006:
Twentieth Annual Survey, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 697, 742-47 (2006) (suggesting that the recent
practice of including not only a choice-of-law clause, but also a choice-of-forum clause assigning
exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of another state that enforces non-compete covenants, has
operated to employers' advantage).
83. In re AutoNation, 228 S.W. 3d 663 (Tex. 2007).
84. Id. at 669.
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A California court also recently enforced a forum selection clause,
allowing the case to be decided in a state that would apply laws
favorable to enforcement of a non-compete agreement. 8 Notably, the
other court had already commenced proceedings, so it is not clear how
much of the California court's holding was based on comity.
Nonetheless, the language of the opinion suggests the court would
have upheld the forum selection clause regardless of this. Even
Georgia, which goes to great lengths to avoid enforcing choice of law
clauses, has been willing to enforce forum selection clauses.86
In sum, when a conflict of laws issue arises in litigation over
employee restrictive covenants, choice of law clauses are by no means
foolproof mechanisms for ensuring application of a particular state's
law. The discretionary nature of conflicts rules, combined with the
weight given to public policy concerns, combined with the fact that a
public policy tension sits at the very heart of the law of employment
restraints-a tension between public policies in favor of employee
mobility, freedom of contract, and public access to certain kinds of
professional services-means that resolution of these disputes can be
highly unpredictable and depend a good deal on forum. Forum
selection clauses are more reliable contractual devices for securing
future application of a particular law, but they, too, offer no
guarantee. The result is that, wholly aside from the substantive merits
of a particular dispute over the enforceability of an employee non-
compete agreement, parties have strategic incentives to seek a forum
favorable to their respective positions in order to increase their
chances of a favorable verdict.
As Section III reveals, these incentives are compounded by rules
governing parallel litigation, i.e., multiple suits in different
jurisdictions that have overlapping issues and parties.
85. Swenson v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1105 (S.D. Cal. 2006) ("The
question is not whether the application of the forum's law would violate the policy of the other
party's state, but rather, whether enforcement of the forum selection agreement would violate
the policy of the other party's state as to the forum for litigation of the dispute. . ..
[E]nforcement of the forum selection clause here does not contravene a California policy as to
forum.").
86. lero v. Mohawk Finishing Prods., Inc., 243 Ga. App. 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that enforcement of a forum selection clause, even if contained within an employment contract
that included a non-compete agreement, did not run afoul of Georgia public policy).
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III. PARALLEL LITIGATION AND THE "RACE TO THE
COURTHOUSE"
The law of parallel litigation is complicated, conflicting, and rife
with incentives for parties to seek tactical advantages. When both
parties file parallel lawsuits on the same matter in two different states,
the dispute can take a number of different permutations: the
litigation may end up entirely in federal courts, or there may be a
federal and a state action, or there may be suits in the courts of two
different states. Following a brief overview of the types of relief
parties typically pursue, this part analyzes the various permutations of
parallel litigation that can arise in non-compete disputes.
In a non-compete case, unlike in most employment litigation, the
natural plaintiff is the former employer. The core instrument of
enforcement is an injunction. Where trade secrets or confidential
information are involved, the need for injunctive relief following
departure of the employee may be quite urgent.
To obtain an injunction, the employer must prove that the lawsuit
for which the remedy is sought will likely succeed on the merits, and
that absent injunctive relief, irreparable harm is likely. Because
resolution on the merits will probably involve delay, the plaintiff will
frequently pursue temporary interim remedies available on a lesser
standard of proof. Although our brief overview here of injunctive
relief focuses on federal law, procedures under state law are similar.
The fastest relief is a temporary restraining order (TRO). In
federal courts, a plaintiff can obtain a TRO without the appearance or
consent of the defendant, so long as the plaintiff can show that it made
an effort to notify the defendant and that irreparable injury will occur
before the hearing for a preliminary injunction required by Rule 65(b)
can be held.87 The elements of proof required for a TRO are similar
to those for a permanent injunction, with variations among circuits as
to the scope and weight of the requirements.' The TRO expires
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). See generally Edward T. Kole & Willard C. Shih, Basics of
Injunctive Relief in the Federal Court, 226 N.J. 29,29-30 (2004).
88. The court must consider (1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction. In many
jurisdictions, a court will also consider (3) whether the threatened injury to the movant
outweighs the threatened harm to the non-movant if an injunction is granted; and, (4) whether
the public interest would be served by granting the stay. MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS
LAW 1 (2009); CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D
11A (2009). See also Northeast Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009
(6th Cir. 2006) (enumerating the factors weighed in deciding whether to grant a TRO or
preliminary injunction and noting that these factors are not prerequisites that must be met, but
are interrelated considerations that must be balanced together); Ridgely v. Fed. Emergency
Mgmt. Agency, 512 F.3d 727, 734 (5th Cir. 2008).
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within ten days. 9 Upon expiration of the TRO, a preliminary
injunction may be entered and remain in force until the court is able
to make a final adjudication on the merits of the permanent
injunction. In contrast to a TRO, a preliminary injunction does
require notice to the adverse party, but it can still be secured relatively
quickly and without the full review of the substantive claim,
particularly if a TRO was obtained initially.
Temporary injunctive relief can be a potent remedy on its own
terms. For example, in industries where technological change is rapid,
and the duration of a reasonable restrictive covenant may be
relatively short, an employer that obtains immediate temporary
injunctive relief pending resolution of the ultimate claim may achieve
the functional equivalent of the desired non-compete regardless of the
outcome of the dispute on its merits.' From the departing employee's
perspective, it is critical to anticipate the possibility of immediate
temporary injunctive relief pending resolution of the employer's
substantive claim.
In this regard, declaratory relief may play an important role. A
departing employee who is uncertain of her legal status under a non-
compete agreement can seek a judicial declaration of her rights even
before any coercive legal or equitable remedy is sought by the former
employer. Under the federal Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
parties may ask federal courts to declare their rights and legal
relations, included in or independent of another substantive
pleading.91 The declaration has full res judicata effect. 92 Almost all
states have adopted either the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act or
a separate statutory declaratory judgment provision that creates
similar rights.93 An employee who has signed a non-compete
agreement in a state willing to enforce them, but who is relocating to a
state that disfavors enforcement may have a clear incentive to seek
declaratory relief in the destination state, assuming jurisdiction of the
destination state over the employer can be established. This, then,
89. Rule 65(b). If the TRO is issued in state court and the matter is later removed to
federal court, the ten-day clock begins at the time of issuance of the state order. Granny Goose
Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda County, 415
U.S. 423, 439-40 (1974) (noting that ex parte temporary restraining order issued in state court
prior to removal remains in force after removal no longer than it would have remained in effect
under state law, and in no event longer than the time limitations imposed by Rule 65(b)).
90. E.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 313 (S.D. N.Y. 1999) (invalidating a
one-year restrictive covenant in significant part on the basis that one year was too long for a
rapidly changing field like the Internet).
91. 28 U.S.C. §2201 (2000).
92. Id.
93. Unif. Decl. Judgments Act §1.
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sets the stage for the proverbial "race to the courthouse" that has
characterized much recent litigation in the area of employee
restrictive covenants.
A. Federal-Federal Parallel Litigation
Although restrictive covenants are a matter of state law, it is not
unusual for federal courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction in cases
involving employees who have relocated to another state.94 If both
parties file in federal court, the party who filed first has a clear
advantage. The "first-filed rule" is a strong presumption across
federal circuits, in the interests of conservation of judicial resources
and orderly administration of justice, that if two lawsuits relating to
the same matter are filed in different federal courts, the first of the
two claims should be allowed to proceed to judgment first.95 The
court of the second-filed action will usually defer by transferring the
action, or by staying or dismissing it (sometimes also known as
abatement).96 In the non-compete context, the consequence of the
first-filed rule is that if the employer and departing employee's
lawsuits both wind up in federal courts, the forum in which the suit
was filed first will usually decide the choice of law question.
The decision of whether to apply the first-filed rule is ultimately a
matter of judicial discretion, and federal courts do not invariably
follow it. However, departures generally require proof by the party
challenging the rule of the existence of special (sometimes
94. A dispute between citizens of different states is considered a "diversity" action,
meaning that, under federal law, an out-of-state defendant may request removal to federal court.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Alternatively, a plaintiff may bring suit in federal court in the first instance.
Id. § 1332(a)(1). The purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction is to protect out-of-state litigants
from potential favoritism by a state court toward the home-state party. Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (overruled on other grounds) ("Diversity jurisdiction is founded
on assurance to non-resident litigants of courts free from susceptibility to potential local bias.").
95. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir.
1979) (declining to abstain, but noting that the first-filed rule "should not be disregarded
lightly"); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 920 F.2d 487, 488 (8th Cir.
1990) (describing the first-filed rule as "well-established"); Kerotest Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip.
Co., 342 U.S. 180, 182-83 (1952) (citing reasons for the first-filed rule). If a lawsuit is initiated in
a state court and later removed to federal court, the time of filing is designated as when it was
filed in state court. Any actions by the state court that removed a case before notice of removal
was filed are presumed to be valid. Palmisano v. Allina Health Sys. Inc., 190 F.3d 881, 885 (8th
Cir. 1999).
96. James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REv. 769, 776-82 (discussing the
range of remedies in parallel litigation). Professor George's article offers an exhaustive, 200-
page treatise on the law of parallel litigation that we found very helpful in preparing our own
treatment.
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"compelling") circumstances.' Examples of such circumstances
include evidence of bad faith, forum shopping, or indications that the
plaintiff who filed first did so in an effort to anticipate and preempt
litigation in a less favorable forum.98 One might suppose that
declaratory actions, when mirror images of a parallel suit, would raise
particular concerns about forum shopping or bad faith. Even here,
however, the mere fact that the first-filed suit is a declaratory action is
not categorically grounds for exception to the first-filed rule.99 Some
courts even take the view that declaratory judgments are anticipatory
by nature, parties have a natural desire to select the preferred forum,
and that this ought not necessarily qualify as the sort of abuse that
should justify departure from the first-filed rule."°
If a litigant in a federal court is unsuccessful in persuading
another federal court to stay or dismiss a parallel proceeding, the
litigant may ask the court in which it brought its own suit to enjoin the
parallel proceeding.1 1 The injunction would be against the opposing
party, rather than the other court, but anti-suit injunctions nonetheless
can be perceived as a challenge to another court's authority and tend,
perhaps for that reason, to be controversial." The factors for
deciding whether to issue an intra-federal anti-suit injunction, if it
comes to that, are essentially the same as for a stay or dismissal. 3
B. Federal-State Parallel Litigation
The law is more complicated for federal-state parallel litigation.
The facially contradictory holdings of the Supreme Court in two
decisions published thirty-five years apart, Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co.
of America,1" and Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. No. 7 v.
97. See Michael A. Cicero, First-to-File and Choice of Forum Roots Run too Deep for
Micron to Curb Most Races to the Courthouse, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 547, 553-
57 (tracing the evolution, and intensification over time, of the first-to-file presumption in federal
courts).
98. See George, supra note 96 at 787-88 (enumerating factors variously invoked in arguing
special circumstances).
99. Koresko v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 403 F. Supp. 2d 394, 401 (E.D.Pa. 2005) (holding
that the "first-filed" rule between federal courts applies to declaratory judgment actions filed in
good faith, and that some evidence of forum shopping or bad faith must be present to warrant
departure from the rule). See also Fed. Ins. Co. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 808 F. Supp. 347, 350
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (including among the special circumstances that would militate in favor of
dismissal of a first-filed request for declaratory judgment the misuse of declaratory judgment to
gain a procedural advantage and preempt forum choice of the plaintiff).
100. Cicero, supra note 97, at 559.
101. George, supra note 96 at 808-12 (reviewing cases).
102. Id. at 781.
103. Id. at 808.
104. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
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United States, 5 have led to inconsistency in the lower courts. In
Brillhart, the Supreme Court reversed a Tenth Circuit holding that a
federal district court had abused its discretion by dismissing a
declaratory judgment action on grounds that a parallel action was
pending in state court. The Supreme Court held that although the
district court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act, it was under "no compulsion to exercise that
jurisdiction,"1" and that if the mirror image case were proceeding in a
state court - the same issues of state law being involved - there should
be a presumption in federal courts that the entire issue be heard in the
state court.'07 Brillhart set out several non-exclusive factors a district
court should consider in exercising its discretion over whether to
assume jurisdiction." An overarching concern expressed by the
majority opinion was the need to dampen litigants' incentives to
strategically "shop" for the judicial forum most favorable to their
interests.
Colorado River involved a water-rights dispute in which the
United States government sought a declaration in federal court of its
riparian rights in Colorado's water division No. 7. Here, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's reversal of a district court
decision to abstain in deference to state court proceedings in division
No. 7. The 4-3 majority opinion explicitly distinguished the case at
bar from concurrent jurisdiction between federal courts, stating that in
state-federal parallel litigation, there is no presumption that a federal
court will defer to a parallel state suit. Due to the "virtually
unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction
given them," the opinion held, a federal court may abstain in order to
conserve federal judicial resources only in "exceptional
circumstances."'' 9 This is true "even if diversity of citizenship is the
105. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. No. 7 v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
106. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494.
107. Id. at 495 ("[O]rdinarily it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal
court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court
presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same parties.").
108. Id. The factors to be weighed were (1) the scope of the pending state proceeding and
the nature of the defenses available there; (2) whether the claims of all parties in interest can
satisfactorily be adjudicated in that proceeding; (3) whether the necessary parties have been
joined; and, (4) whether such parties are amenable to process in that proceeding. In a later
decision, the Court added to the discretionary factors consideration of (5) avoiding piecemeal or
duplicative proceedings; and (6) avoiding forum shopping. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S.
277, 280 (1995) (upholding district court decision to stay declaratory judgment action in favor of
parallel state litigation).
109. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817. See also Estee Lauder Cos. Inc. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp.
2d 158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying defendant's motion requesting federal court to abstain to
first-filed state court order and noting "[b]ecause extraordinary circumstances have not been
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only jurisdictional foundation."'".. Colorado River thus delivered an
alternative, "balancing" approach for federal courts faced with the
question of whether to defer to an ongoing state action."' The order
of filing is only one factor listed among several, rather than
preeminent as it is in the case of parallel litigation between two
federal courts."'
Colorado River thus spawned confusion in the lower courts as to
what presumption ought to inform federal courts faced with a parallel
pending state suit. This was resolved to some degree after another
twenty years by Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., in which the Court clarified
that Brillhart remains good law on Brillhart facts, i.e., when the
question in the federal court is whether to stay a federal declaratory
judgment action that parallels a state action."3 The distillation of the
rule offered by these cases appears to be that a federal court may (1)
apply the Brillhart standard to stay a federal declaratory judgment
action that parallels a state action; or, (2) apply the more rigorous
Colorado River balancing test to stay or dismiss a federal action,
whether it seeks federal declaratory relief or not.'14
The contrast between two federal non-compete cases, Manuel v.
Convergys Corp."5 and Google, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,"6 illustrates
the broad scope for interpretation of the discretionary doctrines
governing federal-state parallel litigation. In Manuel, an employee of
established, the motion is denied."); Cent. States Indus. Supply, Inc. v. McCullough, 218 F. Supp.
2d 1073, 1094 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (refusing to stay proceedings).
110. BASF Corp. v. Symington, 50 F.3d 555,557 (8th Cir. 1995).
111. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-19 (setting out factors including the assumption of
jurisdiction by either court over any res or property; inconvenience of the federal forum;
avoidance of piecemeal litigation; the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent
forums; whether state or federal law supplies the rule of decision; and whether the state court
proceeding will adequately protect the rights of the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction).
See also Cone Mem. Hosp v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 19-27 (1983).
112. E.g., even if it will abstain because of a parallel state court proceeding, it might not use
pure order of filing. Under the fourth factor, which examines which case has priority, the order
in which jurisdiction was obtained "'should not be measured exclusively by which complaint was
filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress has been made in the two actions."'
Evanston Ins. Co. v. Jimco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir. 1988). See also Estee Lauder, 430
F. Supp. 2d at 168.
113. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286 (asserting that federal courts have more leeway to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction in the context of declaratory judgment than in other contexts, and need
not limit such discretion solely to "exceptional" circumstances). See also MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007) (noting that district courts have been given
considerable discretion to decide whether to grant declaratory relief because facts bearing on
usefulness of the declaratory judgment remedy, and fitness of case for resolution, are peculiarly
within their grasp).
114. See George, supra note 96, at 855-62 (analyzing Brillhart, Colorado River, and
progeny).
115. Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2005).
116. Google, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N. D. Cal., 2005).
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Convergys, a large company whose principal place of business was
Ohio, resigned from his job at a Florida subsidiary of Convergys and
accepted a position in Georgia. Mr. Manuel's contract with
Convergys contained a non-compete with an Ohio choice of law
clause.1 7 When Manuel consulted an attorney, he was counseled that
if Convergys obtained an Ohio judgment validating the non-compete,
a Georgia court would likely enforce it and therefore that his best
course of action would be to file first in Georgia."8 Between April 5
and April 20, 2004, Manuel did three things: he obtained a Georgia
driver's license and a lease on a Georgia apartment; he told
Convergys, where he had given notice but was still working, that he
was not going to work for a competitor and that he had not accepted a
job with another company; and he filed a request for declaratory
judgment in a Georgia state court."9
Convergys responded by having the matter removed to a Georgia
district court and filing a separate action in an Ohio state court to
enforce the covenant. 2 ° Convergys then requested that the district
court defer ruling on Manuel's motion pending resolution of the Ohio
state action. The district court denied Convergys' request and granted
summary judgment to Manuel. 2'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion by
the district court. Several aspects of the Court of Appeals decision are
noteworthy. First, although the court cites Wilton v. Seven Falls as
authority for the applicable standard of review, it is hard to read the
case as consistent with the spirit of Wilton. There, where the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the "unique and substantial" discretion
of the district court was in the service of upholding a district court's
decision to stay a declaratory judgment action during pendency of a
parallel state proceeding due to concerns about forum shopping.
1 22
The Manuel opinion, citing that same discretion, found no clear error
of judgment by the district court, and gave central weight to the
federal first-filed rule. The court cited the "compelling
circumstances" that must exist to deviate from the first-filed rule,
although it drew no distinction between the federal-federal parallel




121. Id. The district court also granted Manuel's motion to dismiss a counterclaim by
Convergys alleging misappropriation of trade secrets.
122. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. at 277, 279-80 (1995).
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litigation case it cited as authority for the rule, and the facts of the
case at bar, which involved a federal-state parallel."2
Second, in the face of strong evidence of anticipatory filing, the
Court of Appeals asserted that "even if a court finds that a filing is
anticipatory, this consideration does not transmogrify into an
obligatory rule mandating dismissal. Such a finding still remains one
equitable factor among many that a district court can consider in
determining whether to hear a declaratory judgment action."'' 4 The
Court of Appeals was transparent about its normative posture: in
response to the defendant's argument that Manuel had engaged in
improper forum shopping, the court stated simply that "there is
nothing inequitable in Manuel seeking legal advice and later choosing
to work in a state that shared his view that the NCA [non-compete
agreement] was invalid and unenforceable."'" In essence, the
Eleventh Circuit was unfazed by the possibility of strategic litigation,
but rather suggested that such is the stuff of adversarialism.
By contrast, in Google v. Microsoft, a California district court
stayed a first-filed declaratory judgment action by an employee, Kai
Fu Lee, who resigned his position as Vice-President of Research and
Development with Microsoft in Washington to accept a job with
Google in California.'26 Lee had signed a one-year non-compete
agreement that contained a Washington choice of law clause. The
district court applied Brillhart's discretionary test and concluded that
granting declaratory relief would reward forum shopping on the part
of plaintiffs Google and Lee, who "admit they filed [for declaratory
action] to try to secure a California forum.' ' 27
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Brilihart
should not apply because the suits were not true mirror images, as the
respective courts would apply different rules to resolve the same legal
issues." The district court declared this argument to be flawed
because it overlooked the fact that the Restatement test for deciding
choice of laws (adopted in both California and Washington) is forum-
neutral, i.e., if the Washington court were to find that California has a
materially greater interest than Washington in the validity of the
123. Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d at 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 2005).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1137. The court also quoted the 5th Circuit decision in McGuin v. Texas Power &
Light, 714 F.2d 1255, 1261 (5th Cir. 1983): "The existence of these choices [among various
jurisdictions] not only permits but indeed invites counsel in an adversary system, seeking to serve
his client's interests, to select the forum that he considers most receptive to his cause."
126. Google, Inc. v. Micosoft Corp., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (2005).
127. Id. at 1021.
128. Id. at 1022.
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covenant, then the Washington court must apply California law to
decide the question of enforceability. 129 There was no reason, said the
district court, that Google and Lee could not cite precedent such as
Application Group v. Hunter"3 in urging the Washington court to
apply California law.'
In sum, the legacy of Supreme Court jurisprudence in Brillhart,
Colorado River, and Wilton is to give wide latitude to courts faced
with federal-state parallel litigation, including in the context of non-
compete agreements. Unless and until the Supreme Court offers
further guidance, the federal (and state) courts may continue to take
widely divergent views on whether strategic forum shopping even
ought to be a matter for concern.
Thus far, the discussion has focused on discretionary decisions by
federal courts to defer to another court by staying, transferring, or
dismissing a suit. As in the federal-federal context, injunctions against
proceedings in other courts are also an option. There are, however,
very strict limits on the power of federal courts to enjoin parallel
judicial proceedings in state courts. The Anti-Injunction Act132
provides that federal courts "may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court" unless the injunction falls within one of
three specified exceptions. 133  The Act has been interpreted as
applying to declaratory judgments if those judgments have the same
effects as an injunction."34 Despite the presence of exceptions, this is
not an instance where the exceptions swallow the rule, and the
Supreme Court has clarified that any doubts as to the propriety of a
federal injunction against state court proceedings should be decided in
favor of allowing state courts to proceed to resolution.'35 Moreover,
129. Id. at 1023.
130. Application Group v. Hunter, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). Recall the
earlier discussion of the California Court of Appeals' decision to ignore a Maryland choice of
laws clause on the basis that California had a materially greater interest in deciding on the
enforceability of a non-compete agreement between a Maryland company and a former
employee who accepted a position with a California company. The court reasoned that applying
the law of another state that might enforce the non-compete covenant would be contrary to
California's fundamental public policy. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
131. Google, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2009).
133. Id. The exceptions are where the injunction is "expressly authorized by Act of
Congress," "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction," and "to protect or effectuate its
judgments" (also known as the "relitigation exception"). Also-although not an exception,
exactly-the Anti-Injunction Act does not preclude injunctions against commencement of state
judicial proceedings; only those judicial proceedings already initiated.
134. Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 448 F.2d 1328, 1332 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. den. 404 U.S. 1019 (1972). See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, § 4222 n.11
(reviewing authorities).
135. Atlantic Coast Line Rwy. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970).
See also WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 88, § 4226.
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even if an exception applies, an injunction is not inevitable: the court
must be satisfied as a separate and distinct matter that issuing an
injunction would not undercut principles of equity, comity, or
federalism that additionally restrain federal courts from interfering
with state court proceedings.
136
Although the analysis in this section has focused on federal law
with respect to parallel state litigation, the rule relating to the
converse proposition-a state court enjoining litigation in a federal
court-is clear: "While Congress has seen fit to authorize courts of
the United States to restrain state-court proceedings in some special
circumstances, it has in no way relaxed the old and well-established
judicially declared rule that state courts are completely without power
to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions....
C. State-State Parallel Litigation
If parallel actions proceed simultaneously in two state courts, the
first-to-file presumption does not exist. Until another state issues a
final judgment, other states are not bound. 38 A state court may defer
to another state action filed first, but usually will not do so by reason
of avoiding duplicative litigation alone.'39 State courts are more likely
to defer to actions in sister states if the second filed action is a
declaratory action, if there is a forum selection clause selecting the
other state, or based on the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens, which relies heavily on equitable principles of judicial
comity." When a state does defer on one or more of these grounds, it
is more likely to stay than dismiss the action. 4' Thus with inter-state
litigation as with other kinds of parallel litigation, securing a favorable
forum, and securing it first, can confer a strategic advantage.
In the remainder of this section, we focus our attention on two
specific areas where questions about the proper interaction between
state courts has generated sharp controversies affecting employee
non-compete litigation. The first is the question of the geographic
136. WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 88, § 4224 n.22, § 4222 nn.41-43 (citing Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972)).
137. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1964).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, supra note 35, § 107 ("A judgment will not be
recognized or enforced in other states insofar as it is not a final determination under the local
law of the state of rendition"); Hulcher Servs. Inc. v. R.J. Corman R.R. Co., 247 Ga. App. 486,
489 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (not first injunction, but final adjudication of the merits entitled to res
judicata and collateral estoppel).
139. George, supra note 96, at 822-23.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 838.
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reach of civil judgments and attendant remedies issued by state courts.
The second is the problem of "dueling" anti-suit injunctions.
1. The Scope of Full Faith and Credit
An important question is how much deference state courts are
constitutionally required to give to injunctions issued by sister states.
(Here, we do not mean anti-suit injunctions of the sort discussed in
the previous section; the subject here is the geographic scope of
injunctions issued as a means of contract enforcement). At one time,
Georgia courts were willing to give employees both declaratory relief
and broad injunctive relief prohibiting an employer from attempting
to enforce a non-compete anywhere else in the world. 42 This had a
potentially sweeping effect on non-compete law: assuming other
states' courts' willingness to honor worldwide injunctions issued by
Georgia courts an employee could, by making a sojourn to Georgia,
vitiate the effect of a non-compete agreement not just in Georgia, but
everywhere.'43
Federal courts applying Georgia law, however, retreated
following the 1998 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v.
GM, which although not involving a non-compete agreement, is the
leading decision on this question.1" Baker involved a GM employee
who had settled a lawsuit with GM in a Michigan state court. As part
of the settlement, the employee was not allowed to testify against GM
in the future.145 New plaintiffs filed suit against GM in Missouri state
court and GM removed to federal court.146 The district court allowed
the employee to testify because not allowing him to testify would
violate the public policy of Missouri. 147 GM appealed based on the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, saying that only a Michigan court should
have been allowed to modify the order.'"
142. Enron v. Capital & Trade Res. Corp. v. Pokalsky, 490 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(upholding declaration that NCA entered into in Texas and having Texas choice of law clause
was void and upholding injunction against its enforcement anywhere in the world).
143. David, supra note 54 at 401 (arguing that the 'startling repercussion' of Enron was that
'Georgia could serve as a transitory stop or waypoint for employees seeking to shed the duties of
their NCAs."').
144. Baker v. General Motors, 522 U.S. 222 (1998). See also Comment, Non-Compete
Agreements and the Equity Conflict: Applying Baker v. General Motors Through the Lens of
History, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 253 (2008).
145. Baker, id. at 228.
146. Id. at 229.
147. Id. at 230.
148. The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
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The Supreme Court rejected GM's appeal, making clear the
Michigan injunction did not reach the employee's conduct in other
states.149 The Court stressed that state courts need only to give full faith
and credit to the substantive decisions of their sister states and not to the
remedies they prescribe.5 ' "Enforcement measures," the Court stated,
"do not travel with the sister-state judgment as preclusive effects do; such
measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of forum law.' 151
Applied to non-compete agreements, Baker would suggest that a state
court is bound by the merits of a sister state's final determination
regarding the validity of a non-compete agreement, but is not required to
apply the injunctive remedy ordered by another state's court. 52
Five years later, the Eleventh Circuit decided Keener v.
Convergys Corp. (which, recall, upheld a Georgia district court
decision to disregard an Ohio choice of law clause and declare the
parties' NCA invalid under Georgia law against an employee who
relocated to Georgia).'53 The court ruled that the district court's
authority to enjoin enforcement of the non-compete agreement was
limited to within the borders of Georgia, asserting that "Georgia
cannot in effect apply its public policy decisions nationwide... , In
its subsequent decision of Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennon
Companies, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit elaborated on the reach of
declaratory judgments.'55 There the plaintiff challenged a Georgia
district court decision that, citing Keener, limited to Georgia its
declaration invalidating an out-of-state non-compete agreement and
its injunction against enforcement of the agreement.'56 The plaintiff
invoked the Full Faith and Credit clause, contending that it applied to
the district court's judgment and prohibited the court from curtailing
the extraterritorial effect of its judgment.5 '
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Its
implementing statute, Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738, provides in relevant part: "The records and judicial
proceedings of any court of any ... State, Territory or Possession ... shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they
are taken."
149. Id. at 233.
150. A money judgment is a substantive decree enforceable nationwide. Id. at 234.
151. Id. at 235.
152. See Comment, supra note 144, at 268.
153. Keener v. Convergys Corp., 342 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2003). See also supra text
accompanying notes 59-61.
154. Id. at 1269.
155. Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennon Co., Inc., 404 F.3d 1297, cert den. 546 U.S.
998 (2005).
156. Id. at 1307.
157. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that the district court's authority
to enjoin enforcement of a non-compete agreement was limited to
within the borders of Georgia, but clarified that Keener applied only
to injunctions, and not declaratory judgments.'58 For judgments
rendered by state courts, the court observed, wherein the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and its implementing legislation govern claim and
issue preclusion, a final judgment in one state has force nationwide,
even if the rendering state's judgment is based on public policy
offensive to the enforcing state.'59 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that
since Georgia state courts had not limited the scope of declaratory
judgments in non-compete cases to Georgia, neither should a federal
court sitting in Georgia and applying Georgia law."6 As such, the
court vacated the district court's declaratory judgment to the extent it
attempted to limit its application to Georgia.
The cleaving of substantive judgments from remedies for
purposes of extraterritorial force shifts the focus, but not the
existence, of strategic incentives in parallel litigation. Non-Georgia
employers whose employees relocate to Georgia must simply shift
their focus from being the first to obtain a TRO or preliminary
injunction, to being the first to bring litigation to final judgment?6'
2. The Specter of "Dueling" Anti-Suit Injunctions
The majority in Baker explicitly identified anti-suit injunctions as
falling outside the ambit of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 62 The
clause applies only to final judgments, which anti-suit injunctions are
not.' 63 The opinion suggested that the current state of law, by
compelling no deference to an anti-suit injunction outside the issuing
state, may strike the most reasonable compromise between more
158. Id. at 1309.
159. Id. Note that the ruling was issued by a federal court and the Full Faith and Credit
clause does not apply to federal courts. The court explained that federal common law
determines the scope of judgments for federal courts sitting in diversity, and provides that an
enforcing court should apply the law of the state courts in the state where the rendering federal
court sits (citing Semtek Int'l v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2000)). Id. at 1310.
160. Id. at 1310 (citing Hostetler v. Answerthink, 599 S.E.2d 271, 275 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004),
which held that under Georgia law of claim and issue preclusion, a final declaratory judgment
with respect to a non-compete agreement precludes subsequent claims or issues from being
relitigated in other states).
161. Don Benson & Stephanie Bauer Daniel, New Race to Tennessee and Georgia
Courthouses over Non-Competition Agreements, 41 TENN. B.J. 18, 25-26 (2005) (focusing on
Tennessee litigation strategies and concluding that "a race to the courthouse may be the only
reliable protection for Tennessee employers" with operations in or near Georgia).
162 Baker v. General Motors, 522 U.S. 222, 236 n.9 (1998).
163. See generally, George, supra note 96, at 840-49.
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extreme positions that would give one state control over what goes on
in another state's courts. 64
The case of Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc. has gained
notoriety for raising the specter of "dueling" anti-suit injunctions in
inter-state disputes over restrictive covenants.165 Stultz, a manager in
Minnesota for Medtronic, a company that designed and manufactured
medical devices, resigned to accept a job with Advanced Bionics, a
California competitor. When hired at Medtronic, Stultz had signed a
two-year non-compete with a Minnesota choice of law clause. The
day after Stultz resigned, Stultz and Advanced Bionics filed in
California for a declaration that the non-compete agreement was
unenforceable under California law; the next day, they applied for a
TRO enjoining Medtronic from taking any action to enforce the non-
compete agreement in a court other than the California court that was
deciding the declaratory judgment action. Medtronic responded by
removing the matter to federal court and filing a separate suit in
Minnesota state court to enforce the non-compete.
The Minnesota court issued a TRO (which later was dissolved
and replaced by a preliminary injunction) enjoining Stultz from
working for Advanced Bionics, and also enjoining Stultz and
Advanced Bionics from taking any action to interfere with the
Minnesota proceeding. 66 Meanwhile, the federal court in California
remanded the matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the
state court, in turn, granted the plaintiffs' anti-suit injunction. The
Minnesota court directed Stultz and Advanced Bionics to move to
vacate the TRO obtained in the California action, but that court
refused to vacate its order. 167 Medtronic appealed, without success, to
the California Court of Appeals. The California Supreme Court
reversed.
The California Supreme Court expressed a strong reluctance use
a TRO to enjoin proceedings in a sister state, "for its exercise
represents a challenge, albeit an indirect one, to the dignity and
authority of that tribunal."'" The court acknowledged that "[t]he
possibility that one action may lead to a judgment first and then be
applied as res judicata in another action 'is a natural consequence of
parallel proceedings in courts with concurrent jurisdiction, and not
164. Baker, 522 U.S. 236 n.9.
165. Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 59 P.3d 231 (Cal. 2002). We borrow the
analogy to "dueling" from David, supra note 54, at 409.
166. Advanced Bionics, 59 P.3d at 234.
167. Id. at 235.
168. Id. at 236 (quoting Arpels v. Arpels, 170 N.E. 2d, 670, 671 (N.Y. 1960)).
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reason for an injunction.""69  The court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that California's strong public policy against non-compete
agreements provided the exceptional circumstance of the sort that
should justify upholding the California TRO, and asserted that even if
the contract would be void in California, sovereignty concerns and the
principle of comity compelled judicial restraint.17 ° The court also
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the first-filed rule offered
alternative support for upholding the TRO, stating simply that the
first-filed rule was never meant to apply where the two courts
involved are not courts of the same sovereignty.17  The court
concluded that "Advanced Bionics remains free to litigate the
California action unless and until Medtronic demonstrates to the Los
Angeles County Superior Court that any Minnesota judgment is
binding on the parties." ' The concurring judgment of Brown, J. very
explicitly identified the contractarian and forum-shopping concerns
that informed her decision: "Stultz, having enjoyed the benefits of his
contract with Medtronic, should not be free to avoid his side of the
agreement and thereby cancel some of the value for which Medtronic
legitimately bargained."17' And later:
[C]ourts have a natural bias favoring the law of the state in which
they sit, and litigants are aware of this bias, explaining in part the
procedural maneuvering and forum shopping that occurred here. If
we permit California courts to apply California law to a dispute
like the one at issue here, then California's economic strength gives
rise to a kind of political imperialism, absorbing every state into
the California legal ethos. Relocating to California may be, for
some people, a chance for a fresh start in life, but it is not a chance
to walk away from valid contractual obligations, claiming
California policy as a protective shield. We are not a political safe
zone vis-A-vis our sister states, such that the mere act of setting foot
on California soil somehow releases a person from the legal duties
our sister states recognize.
174
California courts have continued to take a conservative approach
to issuing anti-suit injunctions. 75 However, this may not be true in
other states. Some courts, for example, are statutorily restrained from
169. Id. (quoting Auerbach v. Frank, 685 A.2d 404, 407 (D.C. 1996)).
170. Id. at 237.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 238.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 239.
175. See, e.g., Biosense Webster, Inc. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 4th 827, 839 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (holding trial court abused its discretion in ordering anti-suit injunction in cases
involving employees who moved from one California employer to another after having signed
non-compete agreements containing New Jersey choice of laws clauses).
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deferring on the basis of comity when doing so would violate a
fundamental public policy of the state.176
When taken together, modem rules on choice of laws and parallel
litigation create significant incentives for parties in litigation over non-
compete agreements to seek an advantageous forum. In the next and
final part of this article, we briefly consider the normative implications of
these incentives for forum shopping, and the evidence (based on our
survey of selected reported cases) suggesting that the practice occurs and
may be on the rise.
IV. A MARKET FOR LAW?
In a recent article, Professors Erin O'Hara and Larry Ribstein
argue that a "second revolution" is underway in the realm of conflict
of laws (the first having been the shift from bright-line but arbitrary
rules to more nuanced but ultimately equally arbitrary standards).'77
In this second revolution, increasing ease of party and asset mobility
fuels a regime in which parties choose their own governing law (by
using choice of law or forum selection clauses, and by relocating
activities and operations to jurisdictions that enforce those contracts,
and avoiding those that do not).'78 As a consequence, they argue, the
interests of individual parties and firms have begun to take
precedence over the interests of states.
O'Hara and Ribstein do not lament the change; instead they
argue that, as a normative matter, letting parties shop for the laws of
jurisdictions outside their place of residence is likely to increase
efficiency, and that as a practical matter, "states must either get on the
jurisdictional-choice bandwagon or lose their power to regulate
altogether." '79 For the market for law to be efficient, O'Hara and
Ribstein argue, there must be a very strong thumb on the scale for
deferring to party choice."8 To the extent party choice is overridden
at all, it would occur in only the exceptional case, by politically-
determined, clear, predictable legislative rules, rather than routinely
by judges applying discretionary doctrines limning vaguely defined
176. David, supra note 54, at 410 (suggesting that if a Medtronic scenario were to arise in
Georgia, the Georgia courts would be precluded by Georgia Constitution § 1-3-9 from deferring
to other jurisdictions on the basis of comity).
177. Erin Ann O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Rules and Institutions in Developing a Law
Market. Views from the United States and Europe, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2147, 2149 (2008).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2157.
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public policy and state interests. 8' An example of the role for
legislative override would be in a case where interstate competition
for law market "patrons" turned into a race to the bottom leading to a
choice of law regime insufficiently protective of some aspect of public
welfare (O'Hara and Ribstein offer the example of spiraling laxity of
laws regulating sales of child pornography). 8 -
Thus, O'Hara and Ribstein acknowledge that the market-for-law
model might have limitations in certain areas of contracting. More
specifically, where there is unilateral control over choice of law, or
asymmetry between the parties in terms of their sophistication or
access to information that would enable them to understand the range
of negotiable options, the law market might generate negative
externalities.'83 Another cautionary example they cite is consumer
contracts, although they note that consumer groups have proven very
successful in lobbying for concessions in the political process, and
interest-group competition, as suggested by public choice theory,
would enable consumers disadvantaged in the process of bargaining
for choice of law to press for state or federal legislative intervention to
circumvent the law market.
Timothy Glynn, in another recent article, takes a substantially
darker view of the market for law, specifically with respect to non-
compete agreements."8 Glynn anticipates the specter of a race to the
bottom as states compete for business with the promise of employer-
favorable choice of law rules for resolving NCA disputes. As an
example, Glynn cites the Minnesota courts' actions in Medtronic v.
Advanced Bionics,'85 arguing that the Minnesota courts not only
seemed complicit in Medtronic's obstruction of the California action
but also "aggressively sought to ensure extraterritorial application of
Minnesota's employer-friendly NCA law.' 86  While Glynn
acknowledges that "such judicial behavior does not establish that
Minnesota is consciously marketing its legal regime as a commodity,"
he argues nonetheless that "it is consistent with the incentives
described above and illustrates the role courts can play in furthering a
state's competitive aims. In this setting, comity seems to run only one
way, leaving California's public policy at risk to aggressive state-law
exporters.""'
181. Id. at 2159.
182. Id. at 2155-56.
183. Id. at 2158-59.
184. Glynn, supra note 42.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 165-74.
186. Glynn, supra note 42, at 1387.
187. Id.
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Glynn would encourage courts that wish to protect the interests
of employees to exercise the broad discretion afforded them to
disregard foreign choice of law and forum selection clauses, to stand
firm in the face of pressure to defer to a competitor state's
jurisdiction, despite traditional notions of comity, when fundamental
state policies are at stake and the other jurisdiction is not acting
reciprocally, and to embrace the discretion afforded by the Supreme
Court decision in Baker to limit injunctive relief ordered by a
competing state court. 188 Beyond these limited defenses accorded by
current doctrine, Glynn argues, states seeking to defend against
aggressive state-law exporters may need to alter the way in which they
enforce employment mandates, specifically, by shifting to public
enforcement of local law against firms trying to take advantage of
foreign law, rather than relying on private enforcement.
As nonparties to the litigation, agency authorities and attorneys
general are not bound by foreign judgments in disputes between
private parties.... [T]he threatened use of civil or even criminal
sanctions for conduct that directly contravenes local policies may
have its own, countervailing deterrent effect on firms that might
otherwise seek to enforce contract terms in their preferred
forum.189
Both articles are provocative, and are welcome efforts to make
sense of the broader social implications of the confusing body of law
that governs litigation over non-compete agreements having multi-
state features. We think, however, that each article may slightly
overstate its case. O'Hara and Ribstein's confidence that the political
process will enable groups lacking sufficient sophistication or
information to bargain effectively over choice of laws seems heroic.
More is needed to explain why these vulnerable groups would be
expected to organize and lobby reliably and effectively for legislative
override of disadvantageous choice of law rules. To be sure, there are
examples of consumer groups and trade unions that have navigated
the political process with both force and finesse, but there are ample
examples to the contrary as well: unrepresented consumers and
workers who fail to grasp the nature of their contractual rights, let
alone bargain or politically organize to assert them. The gap between
ideals and practicality may be larger than O'Hara and Ribstein hope.
They argue for federal legislative oversight, and yet are in the
minority among scholars who study conflict of laws, a group described
by treatise-writers Richman and Reynolds as having reached a
188. Id. at 1437-40.
189. Id. at 1441.
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"consensus" -despite strong disagreements on the appropriate
alternatives-that the subject matter of conflict of laws is too complex
to be susceptible of effective legislative solutions."
Glynn's characterization of courts such as those in Minnesota as
aggressive state-law exporters, in turn, likely understates the
reciprocal aggressiveness of acquiring firms and the states in which
they are located. To cite examples from our earlier discussion, Mr.
Manuel of Manuel v. Convergys, Mr. Lee of Google v. Microsoft, and
Mr. Stultz of Medtronic v. Advanced Bionics each appeared to be
high-level employees well-advised by lawyers and joined as co-
plaintiffs by powerful corporations that had a strong motive of luring
key employees with valuable information away from major
competitors. Both California state courts and Georgia state and
federal courts have been amply aggressive not just in defending but
also exporting their laws to affect employees residing and employers
doing business outside the state who face very real competition from
California and Georgia rivals. We tend to believe as a policy matter
that innovation and technological change would be well served by the
relaxation of contractual restraints on employee competition. But this
is a different argument from the one that Glynn makes, implying that
employer-friendly states are the predators in the business of exporting
state laws and policies, and that employee-friendly states are the
natural defenders. Notwithstanding our differences of opinion on
factual characterization of the conduct of the parties participating in
the "race," Glynn is rightly skeptical that interest groups favoring
greater employee protection are likely to prevail in pressing for robust
federal regulatory protections.1 9' For states that wish to create a "high
road" employment regulatory regime, the challenges of stemming the
phenomenon by which regulatory competition erodes employee-
protective common law and legislation are very real. If we are to
concede the "disarray" that characterizes modern conflict of laws
doctrine and recognize the very salient incentives for strategic
conduct, then Glynn's realpolitik assertion seems apt that states
wishing to maintain strong employee-favorable laws need to
acknowledge what O'Hare and Ribstein call the "jurisdictional-choice
bandwagon" and meet the competition.
190. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 23, at 279. O'Hara & Ribstein acknowledge that
Congress has not shown an interest in enacting choice of law rules. O'Hara & Ribstein, supra
note 177, at 2177.
191. Glynn, supra note 42, at 1440-41.
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